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CHAPTER 11 
Between State and Market: 
The Political Economy 
of Chinese Arms Exports 
J. D. Kenneth Boutin 
INTRODUCTION 
China's role as an armaments {arms) exporter has developed considerably 
over the past few decades. The country has evolved from a supplier of 
unsophisticated arms largely based on foreign designs to an exporter of 
much more capable equipment incorporating significant local design 
input. China's international arms sales are increasing as its defense-
industrial enterprises market and secure orders for their expanding range 
of products. While China's arms export role remains secondary to that 
of a number of more established suppliers, its importance in the 
international arms market is increasing. 
This chapter examines China's developing arms export profile, includ-
ing the political and economic basis of Chinese arms exports, their sub-
stance and potential, and China's role as an arms exporter. Chinese arms 
exports cannot be analysed in isolation from key domestic and 
international trends. Hence, this study is situated in the context of China's 
industrial development, which determines its arms export capacity, and 
in the context of its policy requirements, which detennine the scope for 
arms exports. Chinese arms exports are being transformed by the struc-
tural transfonnation of Chinese industry and by strengthening economic 
imperatives. The common ground of state and market that characterizes 
China at the present time encourages and facilitates arms exports. Space 
limitations preclude detailing China's extensive admiri.istrative reforms. 
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Likewise, the scope and pace of defense-industrial progress limit the 
u.tility of cataloguing the products or surveying the sectoral strengths of 
China's defense industry, much less forecasting developmental trends. 
THE INDUSTRIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHINESE 
ARMS EXPORTS 
lt is appropriate to approach Chinese arms exports in terms of its 
"defense economy" given the extent to which they are embedded in gen-
era! industrial processes.1 China's development as an arms exporter has 
occurred in tandem with its industrial development, which has played a 
crucial role in determining the nature of the arms available for export. 
China's defense-industrial base has particular strengths and weaknesses 
that have not remained constant over time. 
China emerged as an arms exporter during the Cold War. It began to 
export substantial quantities of locally produced arms after it succeeded 
in replacing and expanding upon the defense-industrial capabilities 
developed in the face of foreign aggression during the nineteenth century 
and added to by the Japanese.2 The level of damage inflicted during 
China's civil war and the Soviet Union's removal of Japanese industrial 
plant following World War II was such that there remained little to build 
upon; China had no option but to start afresh. 
China's leaders pursued defense-industrial development from an early 
point in the history of the People's Republic. The importance of defense-
related technological development was recognized in the Common Pro-
gram of 1949 that served as the new regime's provisional constitution.3 
Though the focus of Chinese policy has varied over time, defense-
industrial development has remained an important objective. 
China's post--dvil war approach to defense-industrial development 
was sound. 1his was situated in the general reconstruction and develop-
ment of Chinese industry and was pursued with the assistance of the 
Soviet Union, with which it enjoyed close relations after 1949. As well as 
providing material support crucial to China's efforts to develop defense-
industrial capabilities far more comprehensive than those of the imperial 
and Nationalist periods, the Soviet Union provided a developmental 
model that was appropriate to China's defense requirements and its 
developing socialist economic system. The key features of this model 
were central planning, a highly centralized structure, state ownership of 
production and research and development {R&D) facilities, and a focus 
on supporting the local defense establishment. China's defense-
indust:rial base was developed to meet the requirements of its People's 
Liberation Army (PLA), and state-owned enterprises {SOEs) were 
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responsible for all arms production, with R&D undertaken at state 
research institutes supported by academic institutions.4 
The attention devoted to defense-industrial autonomy by Chinese 
authorities is noteworthy. The development of autonomous capabilities 
did not constitute an immediate objective in China's early efforts to estab-
lish a defense-industrial base after 1949. As well as presenting a daunting 
challenge given the state of its industrial base and the requirements of the 
PLA, China's dose political relationship with the Soviet Union rendered 
developing indigenous capabilities less pressing. The Soviet Union trans-
ferred substantial quantities of arms, including combat aircraft, armored 
vehicles, and naval vessels, although these generally were older and less 
capable models, some dating from World War II. As Sino-Soviet relations 
deteriorated in the late 1950s, however, there was increasing concern in 
China over defense-industrial autonomy.5 
The objective of defense-industrial autonomy assumed great impor-
tance from the early 1960s. China's growing estrangement from the Soviet 
Union resulted in de<:lining Soviet support, which ceased altogethl;!r by 
1963. This had an adverse impact on China's defense-industrial program, 
and the effect was exacerbated by the security threat now posed by the 
Soviet Union.6 China's international isolation ruled out supplanting the 
Soviet Union as a source of arms, leaving the development of indepen-
dent defense-industrial capabilities the only course open to Chinese 
authorities. 
China's negative experiences as an arms importer have had a lasting 
impact on its subsequent arms exports. In highlighting the perils of 
dependency, this has encouraged sustained attention to the objective of 
developing comprehensive defense-industrial capabilities: Chinese policy 
from the 1960s onward focused on developing independent capabilities 
for all categories of arms required by the PLA. Despite internal debates 
over Ute importance of modern arms to the defense of China, there was 
consensus on the importance of developing and sustaining autonomous 
arms R&D and production capabilities. This was reflected in the extent 
to which the defense-industrial base was shielded from the excesses of 
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966---1976). China was effec-
tively isolated in defense-industrial tenns until warming relations with 
Western states in the late 1970s enabled the development of ties with 
foreign industry. Such contact that existed prior to this point was limited 
to the opportunistic examination of examples of foreign arms that were 
acquired through capture or provided by friendly states, for example, 
the Soviet MiG-23 fighters provided by Egypt.7 This was fortuitous in 
terms of China's arms export capacity. Unlike most developing states, 
China succeeded in developing and sustaining a capacity to export a wide 
range of arms. 
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China's emergence as a significant arms exporter in the 1960s reflected 
its level of defense-industrial development. China demonstrated a capac-
ity to supply a relatively wide range of arms, often in substantial quan-
tities. In qualitative terms, Chinese arms were characterized by their 
inferiority relative to those available from other suppliers, often being 
obsolescent if not obsolete. This resulted from China's underdeveloped 
R&D capabilities; arms were largely copied or closely derived from the 
foreign designs to which China had access. At the same time, however, 
Chinese arms were serviceable and demonstrated sensible application of 
technology. 
CHINA'S DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL EVOLUTION 
Though some features of its established model remain, China's defense-
industrial sector has undergone a structural transformation since the late 
1970s. China entered this period with defense-industrial capabilities that, 
while comprehensive, were not very advanced and were declining in 
qualitative terms relative to those of other major states. This state of affairs 
prompted Chinese authorities to initiate a program of defense-industrial 
development that has carried through to the present. It is noteworthy that 
China was qukk to exploit the opportunities provided by warming rela-
tions in the early 1980s by dispatching technical missions abroad to gamer 
arms-related technological insights.8 
The transformation of its defense-industrial base is largely the product 
of China's general program of post-Cultural Revolution economic re-
form, which has seen the introduction and progressive deepening of 
"market socialism." SOEs have been subject to the general process of com-
mercialization under which firms are encouraged to be economically via-
ble, though they still receive considerable state investment. This has 
driven attention to the basis of commercial success, including in terms of 
efficiency and competitiveness, and China's industrial landscape has 
been reorganized as a consequence. SOEs have far greater independence, 
with considerable scope to restructure their operations and develop col-
laborative relationships with each other and with foreign capability part-
ners in the interest of commercial success. 
The reorganization of the defense-industrial sector since the late 1990s 
has brought it decentralization and the development of two distinct 
"tiers" of defense-oriented SOEs. The backbone of China's defense indus-
try is provided by the first tier of large conglomerates. Notable examples 
include the Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC}, China Aero-
space Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), China Aerospace Sci-
ence and Technology Corporation, China North Industries Corporation 
(NORINCO), China Poly Group Corporation, China Shipbuilding 
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lnd us try Corporation (CSIC), China South Industries Group Corporation, 
and China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC). The second tier com-
prises their subsidiaries, of which there are a large number. Interfirm rela-
tionships, including with the civil-oriented sector of industry, are closer 
and more complex than in the past. This transformation has been sup-
ported by extensive administrative reforms and a number of policy initia-
tives designed to encourage "spin-on" to the defense-industrial sector.9 
Commercialization has meant that there is little practical distinction 
between defense SOEs and their private-se<:tor counterparts. 
One of the most conspicuous features of China's evolving defense-
industrial landscape is the recent emergence of nonstate defense-industrial 
enterprises. While China's defense-industrial structure continues to be 
based around SO Es, the number of private defense firms is growing with 
official encouragement and support. The government has developed 
guidelines for private sector finns to engage in defense-related R&D and 
production, and announced in 2006 that it was prepared to subsidize 
private-sector arms prodm:tion.10 
While China remains an archetypal techno·nationalist state, 
with defense-industrial protectionism resulting in far less exposure to 
globalizing influences than other prominent arms producers, its defense-
industrial base is far Jess isolated than in the past. Many Chinese 
defense-industrial enterprises are integrated into transnational R&D and 
production processes. This is developing through interfirm collaborative 
arrangements, equity investments in foreign finns, and foreign invest-
ment in Chinese firms. 11 These processes have been supported by the 
Chinese gavernment. It has negotiated a number of international agree-
ments covering interfirrn collaboration in recent years, and China's 2010 
defense white paper emphasizes the importance of international collabo-
ration by defense enterprises and institutions.12 
The importance of defense-industrial transformation has been rein-
forced by the PLA's modernization program, which is generating 
advanced arms requirements. The focus of the defense-industrial se<:tor 
in China remains on "security of supply" considerations for the PLA. 
TI1e contribution of the transformative processes outlined previously to 
defense-industrial capability development helps to account for the level 
of official support. The importance of harnessing civil industry to the 
defense sector has been recognized since at least the mid~1980s, for 
example.13 
This also contributes to the willingness of Chinese authorities to moder-
ate their defense-industrial autonomy requirements, despite the arms 
sanctions imposed by a number of states in i989 after the Tiananmen 
Square Massacre. While defense-industrial autonomy remains important, 
China's less threatening security environment has provided space for 
authorities to exploit the opportunities provided by engaging foreign 
206 China and !ntemalional Security 
industry and approach this as a long-term objective, which was the origi-
nal intention of its "self-reliance" (zili gengshattg) efforts.H Foreign indus-
try continues to provide crucial developmental benchmarks and 
support, with Chinese defense firms drawing on it for critical technologi-
cal inputs and components. This is demonstrated by the Chinese practice 
of purchasing foreign arms from which advanced technologies may be 
derived. Tellingly, China produced only 95 of the 200 advanced Su-27 
fighters contracted for before embarking on production of its reverse-
engineered J-11, for ex:ample.15 This approach offers the path of least resis-
tance in developing defense-industrial capabilities, but such practices 
remain a source of tension with states like Russia. Claims made in China 
and elsel':here related to China's independent development and produc-
tion of advanced arms often must be regarded with some reserve. 
A comprehensive national defense-industrial base remains important 
to Chinese authorities, but the current focus is on autonomous produc-
tion, with little evident concern with technological sovereignty. The inte-
gration of Chinese defense firms into transnational industrial processes 
presents particular challenges and opportunities for Chinese authorities 
in light of their concerns but is managed so as to minimize the threat to 
autonomous arms production. This is manifest in the practice of produc-
ing most of the arms required by the PLA with foreign input largely lim-
ited to technology or selected components. 
The structural transformation of China's defense-industrial base entails 
significant long-term implications, including in terms of anns exports. 
This is producing the sustained capability development reflected in the 
qualitative transformation in the arms available from Chinese industry. 
While there are important sectoral differences, China's defense-
industrial base generally has progressed from a capacity to supply rela-
tively inexpensive arms closely modeiled on those of other states to a 
capacity to offer anns that are not state of the art but are relatively modem 
and competitively priced. This transformation is no small achievement for 
a state that for decades had a well-deserved reputation as having little 
capacity for anything beyond copying foreign designs. The importance 
attached to profitability has had a major impact on arms exports. As well 
as encouraging firms to export, this has helped to drive the development 
of newer generations of arms better suited to a wider range of export 
customers.16 
While a number of internal contradictions characterize China's defense-
industrial model as a result of the tension between the requirements of 
autonomy and efficiency, China's defense-industrial base is well posi-
tioned to meet the needs of a range of export customers. The common 
groWld of state and market produced by economic interests provides an 
environment conducive to the export efforts of Chinese industry. Anns 
exports constitute an important means of promoting commercial success 
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and are actively pursued by Chinese defense firms and supported by the 
state. This has provided the basis for increased Chinese arms exports. 
CHINA AS AN ARMS EXPORTER 
China's profile as an arms exporter has evolved considerably over time 
in conjunction with its defense-industrial development and changing pol-
icy requirements. China first exported arms in the early 1950s, when it 
supplied insurgents fighting French colonial forces in Indo-China. China 
transferred substantial quantities of small arms, artillery, vehicles, ammu-
nition, and other items to the Viet Minh from 1950to1956.17 This involved 
the retransfer of arms previously acquired from a variety of sources, 
including arms captured during the Korean War. Regular exports of arms 
by China began only in the 1960s, when its political interests encouraged 
military support for friendly regimes. 
China's defense-industrial development enabled the use of arms 
exports as a key facet of its "defense diplomacy," under which it sought 
to offset both the influence of the United States and that of the Soviet 
Union and to establish its revolutionary credentials following its break 
with the Soviet Union. China's newly capable defense industries made it 
possible for authorities to supplement the export of obsolete Soviet arms 
that were surplus to Chinese requirements with locally produced arms. 
If the arms that it was manufacturing and exporting were relatively unso-
phisticated, they were regarded by Chinese authorities as politically 
important until late in the Cold War. 
China's willingness to provide arms at no or minimal cost during this 
period was a telling sign of the role of political objectives in its arms 
exports.18 Chinese arms were supplied largely to developing states, 
including Mali, North Korea, Sudan, TaQzania, and Zaire. (now the 
Democratic Republic of Congo), but also to a few more developed states 
such as Albania and Romania. Arms were supplied to a number of 
revolutionary movements as well, most notably in Southeast Asia and 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but also in the Middle East. 19 China even exported 
arms to states with which it had no diplomatic relations, such as Israel 
and Saudi Arabia.20 A number of the states reeeiving Chinese arms were 
hostile to the Soviet Union or the United States (in the case of Albania, 
both), while others offered important opportunities for promoting 
China's international position as a friend of the "Third World." 
The nature of the arms exported by China during this period testified to 
its relatively underdeveloped defense-industrial capabilities. The focus 
on meeting the undemanding material requirements of the PLA, com-
bined with the struggle to develop a capacity for the production of more 
advanced arms, determined the types and quality of arms that were 
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Table 11.1 
Representalive Chinese Arms Exported during the Cold War 
Equipment 
Type 62 light tank 
YW531 armored 
personnel carrier 
Type 54 howitzer 
Type 52 recoilless rifle 
Type59 tank 
Type 63 multiple 
rocket launcher 
Shanghai patrol craft 
Huchwan torpedo boat 
Fuqing support vessel 
J-6 fighter 
Recipients 
Albania, Bangladesh, Congo, North Korea, Mali, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zaire 
Albania, Iraq, North Korea, Vietnam, Zaire, Zimbabwe 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Tanzania, Zimbabwe 
Burundi, Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Pakistan, 
Tanzania, Togo, Vietnam 
Albania, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Congo, Iran, 
North Korea, Pakistan, Tanzania, Vietnam, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Iran, North Korea, Vietnam, 
Zaire, Zimbabwe 
Albania, Bangladesh, Congo, Gambia, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Zaire 
Albania, Pakistan, Romania 
Pakistan 
Bangladesh, North Korea, Pakistan, Tanzania, Zambia 
Sour,,,., International Institute for Strategi' Studies, The Millmry Balance {London: IISS, vari-
ous years). 
available for export. Small arms and light weapons, including mortars 
and recoilless rifles, constituted the bulk of Chinese arms exports, though 
tanks and other armored vehicles, artillery, combat and support aircraft, 
and coastal naval vessels were supplied as well, In many cases, these were 
copies or derivatives of Soviet arms such as the BTR-152 armored person-
nel carrier (produced as the Type 56), S-75 (SA-2 Guideline) surface-to-air 
missile (produced as the HQ-2), and Romeo-dass submarine (produced 
as the Type 033). (See Table 11.1.) The qualitative shortcomings of Chinese 
arms during this period were offset to some degree by China's capacity to 
supply them in substantial quantity and on short notice. 
Despite its limitations, China was well received as an arms supplier. 
Otlna helped to meet the arms requirements of a number of states, most 
of which were developing states. The developmental state of defense 
establishments in these countries generated requirements for relatively 
unsophisticated arms that could be absorbed without great difficulty, 
which China was well positioned to supply. The fact that many of the 
arms available from China were copied from foreign designs, most 
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notably from the Soviet Union but also the United States, facilitated their 
introduction into service in these states. The terms under which China 
provided arms proved highly attractive. As well as costing little, Chinese 
arms were appealing in another notable respect: they were provided with-
out the political conditionality that accompanied arms transfers from a 
number of other Eastern and Western states. This was an important factor 
where political authorities sought to avoid becoming dependent on states 
that would use arms transfers as a means of political influence and lever-
age. In this respect, China's defense diplomacy was considerably more 
subtle than that of its international rivals. 
China was a secondary arms supplier during the Cold War compared to 
states such as the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and France, however, and its impact was mixed. Arms transfers from 
China did not prove decisive in any particular Cold War conflict, but they 
were important to efforts by political authorities in a number of states to 
ensure their security and to prosecute conflicts, and to efforts to achieve 
independence from colonial authorities. The impact of Chinese arms 
exports was greatest in supplementing those of the Soviet Union in South-
east Asia. The direct impact of Chinese arms exports outside of the devel-
oping world was minimal. 
It is important to distinguish between Chinese arms exports during 
and following the Cold War. China's approach to arms exports began 
to change toward the end of the Cold War. The political orientation of 
Chinese arms exports began to erode, and economic considerations 
assumed greater importance after Chinese policy entered a more moder-
ate phase in the late 1970s following the end of the Cultural Revolution. 
This trend developed over the course of the 1980s, with the First Gulf 
War between Iran and Iraq seeing China export substantial quantities of 
arms to both sides as a means of generating revenue.21 Though the evolu-
tion of Chinese arms exports in tenns of their substance and objective was 
gradual, their post-Cold War transformation has been remarkable. 
POST-COLD WAR CHINESE ARMS EXPORTS 
China's development as an arms exporter following the Cold War has 
been impressive but not entirely linear in its trajectory. The early post-
Cold War period saw China wane in importance as an arms exporter. 
China's position gradually declined to that of a "supplier of last resort" 
to states like Zimbabwe as the increased availability of relatively inexpen-
sive and often more advanced arms from former Eastern Bloc states, 
including the former republics of the Soviet Union, and from other states 
that had developed substantial arms inventories during the Cold War, 
rendered it less important. The end of the Cold War ultimately constituted 
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a watershed for China, facilitating the transformation of its arms transfer 
profile in qualitative as well as quantitative terms. 
Chinese arms exports gradually recovered and now surpass previous 
levels, They rose to US$1,356 million in 2011 from a low of US$303 million 
in 2000.22 This trend was more the product of China's defense-industrial 
development and strengthening economic imperatives than the exhaus-
tion of the Cold War arms inventories of other potential arms suppliers. 
A number of states possess unwanted reserves of arms from the Cold 
War even today. 
The most striking feature of post-Cold War Chinese arms exports is 
their qualitative transformation. China continued to export some models 
of equipment that had been transferred during the Cold War for which 
there was a market-for example, the Type 69 tank and Type 54 how-
itzer-but its exports have been dominated by much more modern 
designs. China's aerospace sector has made the greatest progress, with 
aircraft such as the JF-17 Thunder fighter owing little to any existing 
foreign design. Its h·ansformation as an arms exporter is manifest in the 
sophistication and diversity of the arms transferred, with China now 
exporting a far more comprehensive array of arms than was the case 
during the Cold War. China's extensive export portfolio now includes 
many categories of equipment that the country previously was in a poor 
position to supply, such as modern communications equipment, air 
defense radars, surface-to-air and antiship missiles, and major surface 
vessels, alongside the range of arms that it exported during the Cold 
War. China's capacity to meet more demanding arms requirements is a 
major factor in its export success. {An indication of China's capacity is 
provided in Table 11.2.) 
It is important to note that charting Chinese arms exports is compli-
cated by the lack of accurate details. For example, considerable confusion 
surrounds recent Chinese transfers of armored vehicles to Sub-Saharan 
African states that are variously reported by different sources. Particular 
difficulties attend identifying and quantifying Chinese defense-
industrial support, the impact of which may not be apparent until well 
after it has been provided. Nonetheless, it is dear that Chinese arms 
exports continue to evolve as well as to expand. 
Sales of complete arms continue.to dominate Chinese arms exports. 
China occupies a particular niche in the international arms market at the 
present time where such arms are concerned, but this differs from the 
position it occupied during the Cold War. It is still the case that the arms 
available from Chinese state and nonstate enterprises generally do not re-
present the state of the art in their areas, but unlike the former case, they 
are relatively modern. Ingrained perceptions of Chinese arms as invaria-
bly obsolescent or obsolete persist, however. One feature of Chinese arms 
that has not changed is that they generally remain competitively priced. 
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Table 11.Z 
Representative Chinese Anns Exports following lhe Cold War 
Hem 
1Jpe90 tank 
WZ551 and WMZ551 
armored personnel 
carriers 
PLZ45 self-propelled 
artillery 
FN-6 surface-to-air 
missile 
WS-1 multiple rocket 
launcher 
K-8 Karakorum 
training /light stri kc 
aircraft 
Z-9 helicopter 
Offshore patrol vessel 
(various classes) 
C-802 antiship missile 
Support for small arms 
production facility 
Form of Transfer 
Licensed production 
Direct sale 
Direct sale 
Direct sale 
Direct sale of WS-1 and 
design assistance for 
improved version 
Direct sale, licensed 
co-production (Egypt 
and Pakistan only) 
Direct sale 
Direct sale 
Direct sale (Algeria and 
Iran), licensed 
production {Indonesia) 
Technical support 
Recipients 
Pakistan 
Argentina, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Chad, 
Gabon, Kenya, Nepal, 
Oman, Rwanda, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Zambia 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Bolivia, Egypt, Ghana, 
l\1orocco,Myallll1ar, 
Namibia, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
Bolivia, Kenya, "1ali, 
Mauritania 
Namibia, Nigeria 
Algeria, Indonesia, Iran 
Nigeria 
Sourc" International lnslitutc for Strategic Studies, The Mililory Balflnco, 2012 (London: IISS, 
2012), ]nnc's Defence Weekly (various lssu~s). 
The form of Chinese arms exports is evolving. Chinese arms exports 
increasingly involve the supply of equipment in a form that requires some 
level of industrial participation on the part of the recipient such as 
licensed or co-production. China also is ~erging as an important source 
of defense-industrial support. This can involve the supply of arms com-
ponents and technology to be used in local R&D and production pro-
grams, including the provision of specialist design assistance, as well as 
212 China and International Security 
support for developing defense-industrial facilities. A number of exam-
ples of the local production of Chinese arms are provided in Table 11.2. 
China has supplied items such as ship engines in support of production 
programs in developing states, including Bangladesh, and has supported 
missile development programs in Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.2·' 
China has a long-standing defense-industrial relationship with Pakistan 
that began quite modestly and has since developed into co-production 
of the ]F-17 and collaborative R&D on the Chinese-led K-8 Karakorum 
trainlng aircraft program. 
China's growing importance as a provider of defense-industrial sup-
port reflects both the evolution of China's defense-industrial base, which 
enables it to provide fonns of support that it was not able to in the past, 
and changing customer requirements. Political authorities in a growing 
number of developing states are approaching arms transfers as a catalyst 
for local defense or even general industrial development. China's position 
on providing defense-industrial support contrasts sharply with that of 
other prominent suppliers, which are much more reluctant to transfer 
advanced anns-related technologies, particularly where weapon of mass 
destruction-capable delivery systems such as ballistic missiles are con-
cerned. Chinese firms recognize the importance of technology transfers 
to a growing number of states and are ~repared to offer "deeper industry 
collaboration" to secure export orders. 
China now supplies ·arms to a far broader range of states than during 
the Cold War, including many states that have not traditionally operated 
Chinese arms. China has built on existing arms supply relationships dat-
ing back in some cases to the 1960s and has developed many new mar-
kets. This list of recipients indudes states of diverse political and 
economic characteristics in Europe and South America as well as regions 
where China has been more active in the past. China is not in a position 
to challenge the dominance of more established suppliers in most export 
markets, but it is supplanting them in particular niches. 
It is with respect to the developing states that China is most prominent 
as an arms exporter. China's success in this section of the international 
arms market is attributable in large part to its capacity to provide anns 
and defense-industrial support that meet local requirements. It ls fortui-
tous for China that its developing capabilities generally correspond to 
evolving customer demands. China's success also is facilitated by its lack 
of conditionality compared to major Western arms exporters; its nonideo-
logical approach to arms exports following the Cold War enhances the 
attractiveness of Chinese arms, particularly where conflict situations and 
internal political conditions complicate efforts to procure arms from 
Western suppliers. While China's apparent lack of principles in arms 
exports is overstated, they are less subje<:t to noneconomic considerations 
than is the case with many other major arms suppliers. China generally 
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has not supported international arms sanctions, for example, those 
imposed on Sudan over its policies in Darfur.25 
Chilla's approach to arms exports is a product of its policy priorities. 
Contemporary Chinese arms exports generally are regarded as state-
driven. Many observers argue that arms exports are pursued with a view 
to attaining important political objectives such as enhancing China's 
international position and offsetting the influence of the United States, 
as was the case during the Cold War.26 Others interpret Chinese arms 
transfers as a means of promoting economic security through securing 
access to the natural resources crucial to China's sustained economic 
development.27 There are noteworthy examples of arms exports to states 
that are important in strateglc tenns, including Pakistan, and to states that 
are suppliers of crucial resources such as oil, including Iran and Sudan. 
However, this conventional wisdom offers what is at best a partial exphm-
ation of the motives underpinning Chinese anns exports. 
The motives underlying Chinese arms exports are more complex th.an 
is commonly assumed. Political objectives in terms of enhancing China's 
general international position are not entirely absent, with arms exports 
constituting one facet of contemporary Chinese defense diplomacy. China 
supplies limited quantities of arms to developing states as military assis-
tance, alongside other forms of support such as training.28 ln some cases, 
this involves refurbished arms that are surplus to the requirements of the 
PLA, but for the most part, these are arms that have been prodm:ed for 
export like the Y-12 transport aircraft donated to the Seychelles in 2011.29 
The supply of arms on concessionary terms is very much the exception, 
however, and only occasionally do Chillese authorities seek to exploit the 
potential of arms exports as instruments of influence. Chinese arms 
exports correspond poorly to what might be termed the "classic" pattern 
whereby arms are transferred on very favorable terms in return for direct 
benefits such as preferential access to markets or resources or a policy 
change on the part of the recipient.30 There is a notable exception in the 
case of Pakistan, with which China has a well-established strateglc rela-
tionship. Here, China has provided substantial quantities of arms and 
extensive defense-industrial support on very favorable terms over an 
extended period of time, which has facilitated the sustained development 
of Pakistan's defense-industrial base. China undertook this role with the 
objective of developing Pakistan's military capabilities and reinforcing 
political relations. Considerations stemming from the nature of China's 
engagement of the international community at the present time temper 
the inclination to approach arms exports as an instrument for strategic 
competition. 
It is crucial to consider the question of the drivers of Chinese arms 
exports in terms of the commercialization of its defense industry and the 
freedom of action accorded defense firms. Chinese arms exports are much 
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less state-driven than in the past. A strong commercial orientation pre-
dominates at the present time, with arms largely being supplied under 
commercial contracts. Chinese defense enterprises have assumed primary 
responsibility for marketing their wares to potential export customers, 
and in the interest of profitability, SOEs and private firms alike aggres-
sively pursue export opportunities wherever these exist.31 Chinese firms 
have been exhibiting their products at foreign defense exhibitions since 
the early 1980s, and the Chinese government, which attaches great impor-
tance to export success, supports these efforts.32 The role of the state is 
largely indirect, with support generally limited to measures such as the 
provision of credit and training. The Chinese .fiovernment does take a 
more proactive approach on occasion, however. The impact of the com-
mercialization of Chinese arms exports is exacerbated by China's less 
stringent arms export control regime, despite efforts to strengthen this 
since the late 1990s. This f)toVides the scope for substantial arms exports 
without official sanction.34 The objectives of export success and those 
commonly assumed to drive Chinese arms exports are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, but the evidence suggests that the latter are secon-
dary determinants at this time. 
PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSION 
Chinese arms exports have not reached their full potential in quantita-
tive or qualitative terms. China's defense-industrial development is not 
likely to abate, with the result that Chinese enterprises can be expected 
to offer increasingly sophisticated products and defense-industrial sup-
port on the export market on competitive terms. China's contribution to 
processes of military modernization, particularly in developing states, 
will potentially continue to grow as a consequence. 
Chinese arms exports are facilitating processes of defense and defense-
industrial development in a growing number of states. Chinese arms 
generally provide a more affordable alternative to arms from Western 
sources. While the anns available from Chinese industry tend not to push 
the technological envelope, they are relatively modern and are more 
readily available, though China has long been supplanted as a "supplier 
of last resort'' by states such as Iran and North Korea. The ongoing devel-
opment of China's defense-industrial base and continued access to tech-
nologies and components from foreign sources will sustain China's 
scope to fulfil this role, despite ingrained perceptions of the inferiority of 
Chinese arms compared to tho.~e available from other prominent suppli-
ers. China's provision of defense-industrial assistance has more far-
reaching consequences over the long term. This is providing the basis 
for the development of defense-industrial capabilities in a growing num-
ber of states, as demonstrated by Pakistan's successful progress from 
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producing relatively unsophisticated Chinese arms under license to 
undertaking advanced R&D in the aerospace field. 
China's growing technical capacity for arms exports must be balanced 
against the potential evolution of the policy environment, however. 
Chinese authorities are now more inclined to take political comiderations 
into account in arms exports. Their response to allegations in 2011 that 
Chinese firms were discussing supplying arms to the embattled Libyan 
government was significant. The Chinese government was quick to point 
out that nothing had been agreed between Libya and the firms concerned, 
and it vowed to strengthen national export controls.35 This is a notewor-
thy shift given China's long-established policy of nonintervention in the 
internal affairs of other states. 
China continues to evolve as an arms exporter. The positive policy envi-
ronment for arms exports resulting from political and economic synergies 
and its ongoing defense-industrial development provide considerable 
scope for an enhanced role in the international arms market. It must be 
considered whether the present lack of tension between political and eco-
nomic objectives in Chinese arms exports will continue, however. There is 
scope for the politicization of Chinese arms exports. While there is no 
indication at the present time that Chinese authorities generally are 
inclined to approach arms exports as a vehicle for strategic competition, 
a policy shift of this nature at some point in the future cannot be ruled 
out and would encourage a substantial rise in arms exports in the interest 
of political influence and leverage. 
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